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Abstract 
We examine the effect of a permanent change to a country income repatriation tax system on a 
set of corporate financial policies.  In 2009 Japan and UK switched from a worldwide system to 
a territorial system for the taxation of earnings repatriated by their multinational firms.  Due to 
the relatively high corporate tax rate in Japan and UK, the new system effectively reduced the 
tax liabilities of most multinational firms when repatriating earnings.  We find that after the 
change Japanese and UK firms accumulate less cash, pay out larger amounts to shareholders 
through dividends and share repurchases, and invest less abroad.  We do not find that the tax 
system change has significantly affected corporate domestic investments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classifications:  F21; F23; G15; G31; G35 
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1. Introduction 
 
The taxation of foreign profits repatriated to the headquarters of U.S. multinational 
corporations has been the subject of a heated debate among policy makers and corporate 
lobbyists in the last few years.1  Countries either adopt a worldwide system (also known as tax-
credit system) or a territorial system (also known as exemption system).  Under the worldwide 
system, used by the U.S. and a minority of other countries, the domestic country levies corporate 
taxes on repatriated profits earned abroad.  If the foreign corporate tax rate is smaller than the 
domestic corporate tax rate, a firm pays taxes to the foreign country on subsidiary income and 
then pays the remaining difference (taxdomestic-taxforeign) to the parent country.  If, instead, the 
foreign tax rate is larger than the domestic tax rate, a firm pays taxes to the foreign country on 
subsidiary income and then receives a credit on the difference (taxforeign-taxdomestic) by the parent 
country (Graham (2008 )). As a consequence multinational firms operating in low-corporate-tax 
countries might choose not to transfer profits back to their domestic country unless necessary. 
Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite (2007) find that U.S. firms facing higher repatriation taxes 
hold more cash.  Most countries adopt instead a territorial system.  Under this system, the parent 
country taxes a firm only on profits earned at home.  Foreign subsidiaries’ repatriated profits are 
exempt.  The repatriation tax system adopted by a country is likely to have significant 
implications on tax receipts, the level on domestic and foreign corporate investments, and 
corporate payout policy. 
                                                          
1 See for example “Corporate taxes, the myths and facts”, The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2012;  “Obama vs. Volcker, Et 
Al. The President's advisers agree with Romney on a territorial tax reform”, The Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2012; “Why 
investors can't get more cash out of U.S. companies”, The Wall Street Journal, February 19, 2011; and “Escaping the 
shakedown”, The Economist, July 4, 2009. 
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In this study we investigate the recent repatriation tax system change in U.K. and Japan.  
These two countries switched from the worldwide to the territorial system at the beginning of 
2009.  This exogenous change provides a unique opportunity to test the different implications of 
the two systems on corporate financial policies of multinational corporations.  Specifically, we 
investigate if the change in the repatriation tax system significantly affects the level of corporate 
cash holdings, the amount of dividends paid and shares repurchased by the parent company, and 
the amount of domestic versus foreign capital expenditures.  We find that Japanese and U.K. 
multinationals accumulate less cash overall, invest less abroad, and distribute more cash to 
shareholders through dividends and share repurchases after the adoption of the territorial system 
in 2009.  However, our results show that the change in the repatriation tax system had no 
significant effect on the level of domestic corporate investments.  Our results have also strong 
economic significance.  A change in the Income Repatriation Tax Cost from its 2006-2008 mean 
value of 0.30 to zero during the 2009-2011 territorial system period causes a drop in 
multinational firms’ cash holdings of about 15%, an increase in dividend yield from 1.67% to 
1.93%, an increase in net payout yield from 1.84% to 2.14%, and a 50% decrease in foreign 
capex/assets from 6.6% to 3.3%, everything else constant.  
This study examines for the first time the corporate financial policy implications of a 
permanent change in a country income repatriation tax system.  Previous studies have been 
confined to the analysis of U.S. samples focusing on a single tax system and a single financial 
policy decision, such as cash holdings (e.g., Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite (2007)) or a 
temporary change in income repatriation taxation, such as the 2004 Homeland Investment Act 
(Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes (2011 )). 
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The findings of this study are particularly relevant to inform the policy debate in the U.S. 
about a possible modification of the tax credit system or a possible switch to a territorial system 
in the same guise of Japan and the UK.  While an analysis of the effect of this change on 
government tax receipts is outside of the scope of this paper, our study shows the strong impact 
that this policy change is likely to have on corporate financial policies of U.S. multinational 
firms. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical questions 
related to the possible implications of an income repatriation tax system change to corporate 
financial policies. Section 3 outlines our sample selection and provides summary statistics and 
univariate analysis. Section 4 discusses our multivariate analysis. Section 5 reports robustness 
checks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses development 
Multinational firms have to consider several possible alternatives on how to best use the 
profits generated by foreign subsidiaries.  Firms can maintain foreign earnings abroad with the 
effect of increasing the subsidiaries’ cash holdings, they can use foreign earnings to increase 
investments in the subsidiary countries, or they can repatriate foreign income to the domestic 
country in the form of intra-firm dividends.  The repatriated earnings can be used to increase 
domestic cash holdings, increase corporate payouts to shareholders, embark in new domestic 
capital investments, or initiate acquisitions. Altshuler and Grubert (2002) argue that firms 
residing in worldwide tax system countries with high corporate tax rates (such as the U.S.) and 
with foreign subsidiaries in countries with lower tax rates tend to avoid the high taxes on 
repatriation by keeping foreign earnings within the foreign subsidiaries.  Grubert and Mutti 
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(2001) find that firms with manufacturing subsidiaries with effective tax rates below 10% 
repatriate on average only 7% of their earnings.  Desai, Foley and Hines (2001) study a panel of 
foreign affiliates of U.S. firms from 1992 to 1997 and find that a decline of repatriation tax rates 
of 1% is associated with an increase of 1% in intra-form dividends.  Repatriation taxes can in 
part explain why US firms hold more cash than what predicted by standard firm characteristics 
(Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite (2007 )). Desai, Foley and Hines (2007) find that US 
companies with attractive domestic investment opportunities are more likely to repatriate 
earnings when the trade-off between external financing costs and repatriation taxes favor earning 
repatriation. However, Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes (2011) show that during the 2004 tax 
holiday, U.S. multinational firms used the temporary repatriation tax break to increase payouts to 
shareholders rather than investing in new domestic projects. 
We formulate our hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Japanese and U.K. firms that face repatriation tax costs during the worldwide 
system period hold less cash overall after the adoption of the territorial system for income 
repatriation. 
Hypothesis 2: Japanese and U.K. firms that face repatriation tax costs during the worldwide 
system period distribute more cash to shareholders in form of dividends and share repurchases 
after the adoption of the territorial system for income repatriation. 
Hypothesis 3: Japanese and U.K. firms that face repatriation tax costs during the worldwide 
system period invest less in new foreign projects after the adoption of the territorial system for 
income repatriation. 
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Hypothesis 4: Japanese and U.K. that face repatriation tax costs during the worldwide system 
period invest more in new domestic projects after the adoption of the territorial system for 
income repatriation. 
Our hypothesis are based on the fact that the great majority of firms headquartered in Japan and 
the U.K. face repatriation tax costs during the worldwide system period due to the higher 
corporate tax rate in this two countries compared to the tax rates in most foreign countries where 
foreign subsidiaries are located.  In fact, only about 2% of our sample has a negative repatriation 
tax cost between 2006 and 2008. 
 
3. Sample and Univariate Analysis 
3.1.Sample formation and variables 
The initial sample consists of the entire population of Japanese and U.K. multinational 
firms covered by WorldScope from 2006 to 2011.   Consistent with previous studies, we remove 
financial firms and utilities.  After removing companies for which tax data or other variables 
used in the multivariate analyses are not available, our sample consists of 8,350 firm-year 
observations (5,303 Japanese and 3,047 UK) and 1,976 unique firms.  Consistent with Foley et 
al. (2007), our sample includes both multinational and purely domestic firms.2 
The main independent variable of this study is the income repatriation tax cost.  Similar 
to Foley et al. (2007), for the period between 2006 and 2008, we compute the income 
repatriation tax cost by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm’s foreign 
                                                          
2 For the multivariate analyses with foreign and domestic capital expenditures as dependent variables, we exclude 
purely domestic firms from our sample. 
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pre-tax income and its effective tax rate.3 We then scale the maximum of this difference or zero 
by total firm assets.  This variable is set to 0 between 2009 and 2011due to the implementation of 
the territorial system in 2009, which effectively removed the tax cost of repatriating earnings.  
We also generate an alternative income repatriation tax cost variable.  This variable is analogous 
to the income repatriation tax cost but for substituting the firm’s effective tax rate with the 
country corporate statutory tax rate. 
The control variables used in the multivariate analysis are firm characteristics that the 
extant literature shows to significantly affect cash holdings, payout policy, and corporate 
investments: Log of Total Assets, Consolidated Income/Total Assets, Market-to-Book Value of 
Equity, Standard Deviation of Operating Income, Leverage, Capital Expenditures/Total Assets, 
R&D Expenses/Total Assets, and Tobin’s Q.  As stated above, our main sample includes 
multinational and domestic firms.  Even excluding tax considerations, multinational firms might 
hold more cash due to a longer delay between the receipt of cash and its use, and more 
precautionary cash holdings due to greater overall risk face by multinational firms (Foley et al. 
(2007)).  Moreover firms with a larger proportion of income generated abroad will proportionally 
pay fewer dividends if most of the foreign income is not repatriated to the domestic headquarters.  
We control for these possible differences with two income variables: Domestic Income/Total 
Assets, and Foreign Income/Total Assets. The dependent variables of the different regression 
specifications are cash holdings, corporate investments and payout policy variables: Cash/Net 
Assets, Domestic Capital Expenditures/Total Assets, Foreign Capital Expenditures/Total Assets, 
Dividend Payout Yield, and Net Payout Yield.  The Appendix describe all variables and their 
sources. 
                                                          
3 We calculate the effective tax rate by dividing income taxes by pre-tax income. 
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3.2.Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the all variables.  We provide aggregate 
statistics for the overall sample along with statistics for the Japanese and UK sub-samples.  The 
Alternative Income Repatriation Tax Cost is larger than the Income Repatriation Tax Cost dues 
to statutory tax rates being usually higher than effective tax rates.  While the median of foreign 
income is 0, its average is $ 96.43 M, which is only slightly lower than the average of domestic 
income ($101.48 M).  These results suggest that more than half of the sample firms are domestic, 
but multinational firms post a large amount of earnings abroad.  This is more pronounced for UK 
firms than Japanese firms.  The mean foreign income of UK firms is higher than their mean 
domestic income.  UK firms have also larger market-to-book ratio, higher q and higher foreign 
capital expenditures than Japanese firms.  Moreover, more than half of UK firms do not pay 
dividends or buy back shares.4 In the main multivariate analyses we include a country dummy.  
We also replicate our multivariate tests by separating UK and Japanese firms as a robustness 
check. 
Table 2 presents univariate tests performed on two sub-samples generated by splitting the 
sample firm-year observations between worldwide period (2006-2008) and the territorial period 
(2009-2011).  The great majority of UK and Japanese firms faced a positive repatriation cost 
during the worldwide period.  Only about 2% of our sample has a negative repatriation tax cost 
between 2006 and 2008 due to the relative high corporate tax rate in Japan and UK.  We present 
the results of t-tests of the difference of the means, and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric 
tests for the dependent variables of the multivariate analysis: Cash/Net Assets, Dividend 
                                                          
4The proportion of UK dividend payer to non-payer in our sample is 49:51. 
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Payout/Total Assets, and Net Payout (dollar amount of dividends plus repurchases less equity 
issuances)/Total Assets, Domestic Capital Expenditures/Total Assets, and Foreign Capital 
Expenditures/Total Assets. The sample for these univariate tests consists only of multinational 
firms.  With the exclusion of Cash/Net Assets, these univariate tests provide preliminary 
evidence of changes in corporate financial policies resulting from the tax system change.  The t-
test of the mean shows that multinational firms are more likely to pay higher dividends and pay 
out more overall (i.e., dividends and repurchases) in the 2009-2011 period when effectively the 
tax cost of repatriating earnings drops to zero.  The Wilcoxon test suggests that domestic capital 
expenditures have also increase after the implementation of the territorial system in 2009.  
Finally both the t-test of the mean and the Wilcoxon test show that  foreign capital expenditures 
to total assets are significantly smaller after the elimination of the income repatriation tax.  
Overall, the results presented in table 2 suggests that, after the adoption of the territorial tax 
system of income repatriation, multinational firms are more likely to transfer income to their 
domestic headquarters to pay more dividends, buy back shares and invest domestically rather 
than abroad. 
 
4. Main multivariate analysis 
Our multivariate analysis consists of several regression specifications that examine the effect of 
the change from the repatriation worldwide system to the territorial system on the decisions by 
Japanese and U.K. firms (a) on the level of cash holdings, (b) on payout policy (both dividend 
payments and share repurchases), and (c) on the amount of corporate investments abroad and in 
their domestic country.  All regressions specifications are fixed effects regressions: 
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itjcitit εαβXy +++= γ         (1) 
where yit is one of the corporate financial policy dependent variables listed below, Xit is a vector 
of the time-varying tax and firm level characteristics listed in the variable section, αc is a country 
dummy, γi are industry fixed effects, and εit is the error term.  We do not include year dummies 
in our main tests because our repatriation tax variables assume the value of 0 for the 2009-2011 
period and, therefore, include a time component. When estimating equation (1) we account for 
serial correlation by estimating clustered (Rogers) standard errors, which are White standard 
errors that account for within firm correlation. 
4.1.  Repatriation Tax Costs and Cash 
Table 3 presents the results of fixed effects linear regressions with the natural logarithm of 
cash to net assets as dependent variable.  In the first specification we use Income Repatriation 
Tax Cost as the tax variable of interest, while in the second specification we use the Income 
Repatriation Tax Cost variable.  The two specifications present a consistent picture.  Both 
repatriation tax cost variables are positive and significant.  Until 2008, when due to the credit 
repatriation tax system firms had to face additional taxes to repatriate income from low tax rate 
countries, UK and Japanese firms significantly accumulated more cash.5  This result is consistent 
with our first hypothesis and confirms the result obtained by Foley et al. (2007) for U.S. 
corporations.  This result has a very strong economic significance.  If the Income Repatriation 
Tax Cost goes from its 2006-2008 mean value of 0.0030 to effectively zero during the 2009-
                                                          
5 As stated previously, firms can enjoy a negative repatriation tax cost (overall tax credit) during the tax credit 
system if the majority of the income repatriated is from countries with tax rates lower than the domestic tax rate.  
However only about 2% of our sample has a negative repatriation tax cost between 2006 and 2008 due to the 
relative high corporate tax rate in Japan and UK. 
10 
 
2011, cash holdings drop about 15% from their median value for multinational firms, everything 
else constant. 
Consistent with previous studies about cash holdings determinants (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz and Williamson (1999 )) larger companies, companies with more debt, more capital 
expenditures, more R&D Expenses and larger payouts (dividends and share repurchases) hold 
significantly less cash.  The positive and significant coefficient of St. Dev. Of Operating Income 
suggests that the firms in our sample accumulate more cash when faced with more uncertainty. 
consistent with what  Arena and Julio (2012)  show for U.S. corporations,  
4.2.Repatriation Tax Cost and Corporate Payouts 
Cash repatriated to the domestic headquarters might be used by corporations to increase 
corporate payouts.  In Table 4 we analyze the effect of income repatriation tax costs on dividends 
and in Table 5 we analyze the effect of income repatriation tax costs on total payouts (dividends 
plus share repurchases).  The results presented in Table 4 show that both proxies for repatriation 
tax costs are negatively and significantly related to the dividend payout yield.  This result is 
consistent with our hypothesis that the elimination of repatriation taxes due to the enactment of 
the territorial system had the significant effect of increasing dividend payments by UK and 
Japanese corporations.  The coefficient of the Income Repatriation Tax Cost implies a large 
change in dividend yield after the implementation of the territorial system. If the Income 
Repatriation Tax Cost goes from its 2006-2008 mean value of 0.0030 to effectively zero during 
the 2009-2011, the dividend yield increases from its median value of 1.67% to 1.93%. 
The control variables have coefficients consistent with the findings of previous studies 
that analyze the determinants of payout policy (cites). Larger companies, more profitable 
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companies, companies with lower leverage, lower R&D expenses and less income volatility 
distribute more cash to their shareholders in form of dividends. 
The results of the net payout yield regressions presented in Table 5 are consistent with 
the results of the dividend regression.  Repatriation tax costs have also a negative and significant 
effect of total net payouts. A change of the Income Repatriation Tax Cost from its 2006-2008 
mean value of 0.30 to zero during the 2009-2011 territorial system period causes a 16% increase 
in net payout yield from 1.84% to 2.14%, everything else constant.  The coefficients of control 
variables have the expected sign consistent with the dividend regression results of Table 4 and 
previous studies on payout policy. 
 
4.3.  Repatriation Tax Cost and Corporate Investments 
Another possible consequence of repatriating more profits after the enactment of the 
territorial system is an improvement in the allocation of funds across countries and a lower 
likelihood to invest in low or negative net present value projects in foreign countries.  We 
investigate this hypothesis with fixed effects regressions with foreign capital expenditures 
divided by total assets as dependent variable.  For these regressions we exclude purely domestic 
companies from the sample.  Table 6 presents the results. 
Both repatriation tax cost proxies have positive and significant coefficients consistent 
with our hypothesis that the effective elimination of a repatriation tax for most firms due to the 
implementation of the territorial system has significantly reduced foreign investments.  The 
Income Repatriation Tax Cost has also a very strong economic significance.  A change of the 
Income Repatriation Tax Cost from its 2006-2008 mean value of 0.0030 to zero during the 2009-
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2011 territorial system period causes a 50% decrease in foreign capex/assets from 6.6% to 3.3%, 
everything else constant. 
The payout results presented in the previous tables show that firms use at least part of the 
cash repatriated to the domestic country to increase distributions to shareholders in form of 
dividends and share repurchases.  Some of the repatriated cash could also possibly be used to 
increase domestic investments.  We test this hypothesis with fixed effects regressions with 
domestic capital expenditures over assets as dependent variables.  As for the regressions of Table 
6, we exclude domestic firms from this test.  Table 7 presents the results.  Neither repatriation tax 
proxies has a significant coefficient suggesting that after the implementation of the territorial 
system UK and Japanese firms do not use the additional cash repatriated to their domestic 
country to increase domestic investments. 
Overall, the tests discussed in this section show that the switch from a tax credit 
repatriation system to an territorial system had the effect of encouraging multinational firms to 
save more foreign cash by cutting foreign investments, to transfer larger quantities of foreign 
cash to their domestic country to increase corporate payouts but not domestic investments. 
 
5. Robustness tests 
As most countries around the world, both Japan and UK experienced a deep recession in 
2008 and 2009.  The recessionary years can possibly generate a bias in the results.6  We replicate 
our multivariate tests excluding the recessionary years’ observations.  All the tax variable 
coefficients maintain the same sign and are statistically significant (with the exception of those 
                                                          
6 We feel, however, that this risk is very limited because the recessionary period is split in half between the tax 
credit system years and the exception system years. 
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for the domestic investments regressions).  The significance is sometimes at a lower level due to 
the smaller sample size which reduces the power of our tests. 
In the main multivariate tests we analyze a sample comprising both Japanese and UK 
firms.  We control for country heterogeneity with a country fixed effect indicator variable.  
However, some of our independent variables could relate to the dependent variables in a 
different way for UK versus Japanese firms.  To check the robustness of our results to possible 
country-specific differences, we replicate our multivariate tests after separating UK and Japanese 
firms into two samples.  As for the other robustness test, the coefficients of the tax proxies 
maintain their sign and are significant at the same or a lower level depending on the regressions. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Countries rarely make clear-cut changes to their taxation rules.  In this study we exploit 
one of these rare opportunities offered by the decision by Japan and the U.K. in 2009 to switch 
from a worldwide to a territorial system for the taxation of repatriated corporate income.  We 
find that this change had broad and significant repercussions on corporate financial decisions. 
The switch from a tax credit repatriation system to a territorial system in Japan and U.K. 
offered multinational firms residing in these two countries the ability to repatriate foreign income 
at no additional tax cost. Overall, the results of this study suggests that the removal of this tax 
disadvantage when repatriating earnings had the effect of encouraging multinational firms to 
save more cash abroad by cutting foreign investments, and to transfer larger quantities of foreign 
cash to the domestic country to increase corporate payouts rather than domestic investments.  
The ability to use more cash from the firms’ headquarters location for payouts had also the effect 
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to decrease overall cash holdings.  The results of this paper might inform the decision-making 
process of policymakers in the U.S. and other countries that are currently adopting a worldwide 
system and are considering a change in their tax repatriation rule.  In more general terms, this 
study underlines how a permanent change in the corporate tax code can have strong, long-
standing consequences for corporate financial policies that can ultimately affect shareholder 
wealth and the level of employment in domestic and foreign countries.  
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APPENDIX 
Variable Definitions and Sources 
All the financial statement data used to construct the variables is retrieved from Worldscope and is 
expressed in US dollars. 
Variable Definition 
Alternative Income Repatriation 
Tax Cost 
The product of a firm’s foreign pre-tax income and its country 
corporate tax rate minus foreign taxes paid.  The maximum of this 
difference or zero is then divided by total firm assets.  This variable is 
set to 0 between 2009 and 2011. 
Log (Cash/Net Assets) Natural logarithm of cash plus marketable securities divided by total 
assets minus cash and marketable securities 
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets   Total cash expenditures divided by total assets 
Dividend Payout Yield Firm’s annual dividend payments divided by its year-end market value 
Domestic Income/Total Assets Domestic earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. 
Foreign Income/Total Assets Foreign earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. 
Income Repatriation Tax Cost The product of a firm’s foreign pre-tax income and its effective tax 
rate minus foreign taxes paid.  The maximum of this difference or zero 
is then divided by total firm assets.  This variable is set to 0 between 
2009 and 2011. 
Leverage (Long-term debt + short-term debt)/total assets. 
Log of Total Assets Natural logarithm of the firm assets 
Net Payout Yield firm’s annual total net payout (dividends plus repurchases less equity 
issuances) divided by its year-end market value 
R&D Expenses/Total Assets Research and Development expenses, set to zero if missing, divided by 
total assets 
Market-to-Book Value of Equity Ratio of the market value to the book value of a firm’s equity 
St. Dev. of Operating Income Standard deviation of the firm’s annual operating income during the 
sample period  
Tobin’s Q Total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, 
all divided by total assets 
Total Income/Total Assets Consolidated earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents means and medians of firm characteristics for the full sample, a sub-sample that includes only Japanese firms, and a sub-
sample that includes only UK firms.   The sample period is 2006- 2011 unless otherwise specified in the table.  The variables are described in the 
Appendix. 
 
Full Sample   Japan   United Kingdom 
 
Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
Income Repatriation Tax Cost 0.0008 0.0000 
 
0.0008 0.0000 
 
0.0006 0.0000 
Alternative Income Repatriation Tax Cost 0.0014 0.0000 
 
0.0012 0.0000 
 
0.0017 0.0000 
Income Repatriation Tax Cost 2006-08 0.0030 0.0000 
 
0.0036 0.0001 
 
0.0018 0.0000 
Alternative Income Repatriation Tax Cost 2006-08 0.0052 0.0000 
 
0.0052 0.0004 
 
0.0051 0.0000 
Total Assets 2346.16 269.26 
 
2292.75 358.95 
 
2489.64 73.03 
Total Income 155.93 10.49 
 
118.45 14.01 
 
256.53 2.01 
Domestic Income 101.48 15.60 
 
108.36 26.62 
 
88.28 0.81 
Foreign Income 96.43 0.0000 
 
73.31 0 
 
140.74 0 
Cash 257.68 35.86 
 
281.16 49.28 
 
194.57 7.36 
St. Dev. Operating Income 68.47 8.24 
 
64.61 9.62 
 
78.92 4.18 
q 1.70 0.99 
 
1.08 0.93 
 
3.38 1.39 
Market-to-Book 1.51 0.93 
 
1.29 0.82 
 
2.13 1.56 
Leverage 0.20 0.15 
 
0.20 0.16 
 
0.19 0.10 
Capex 117.86 5.82 
 
115.62 8.16 
 
124.19 1.36 
Domestic Capex (only multinational firms) 60.98 3.87 
 
38.81 13.94 
 
62.62 3.13 
Foreign Capex (only multinational firms) 139.34 1.45 
 
44.17 4.25 
 
147.18 1.32 
R&D Expenses 82.77 4.44 
 
87.15 5.24 
 
59.48 1.67 
Total Payout Yield 2.80% 1.84% 
 
3.00% 2.13% 
 
2.25% 0.00% 
Dividend Yield 2.47% 1.67%   2.64% 1.89%   1.99% 0.00% 
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Table 2 
Univariate Test 
This table presents univariate statistics for cash, payout and capital expenditure variables that are potentially affected by income repatriation taxes. 
The table contrasts the means and medians of these variables when the repatriation tax cost is positive for most firms (worldwide system period, 
2006-2008) and when instead it is zero (territorial system period, 2009-2011).  For these tests we restrict our sample to multinational firms. The 
last two columns of the table present the p-values of the t-test of the difference of the means and the p-value of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-
parametric test. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2006-2008 
Income Repatriation Tax Cost>0  
2009-2011 
Income Repatriation Tax Cost=0  
diff mean 
t-test Wilcoxon test 
 
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
 
p-value p-value 
Cash/Assets 0.2091 0.1331 
 
0.2123 0.1689 
 
0.498 0.463 
Dividend Yield 0.0158 0.0125 
 
0.0207 0.0136 
 
0.000 0.265 
Payout Yield 0.0206 0.0150 
 
0.0267 0.0172 
 
0.000 0.210 
Domestic Capex/Assets 0.0342 0.0137 
 
0.0360 0.0171 
 
0.664 0.076 
Foreign Capex/Assets 0.0241 0.0119   0.0218 0.0058   0.087 0.000 
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Table 3 
Cash Holdings and Income Repatriation Tax Cost 
This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect regressions with the logarithm of cash divided by net 
assets as dependent variable.  The main explanatory variables are the income repatriation tax cost in the 
first specification and the alternative income repatriation tax in the second specification.  All variables are 
described in the appendix.  The regressions include country and industry fixed effects. P-values, obtained 
with standard errors corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are presented in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Cash/Net Assets) 
  (1) (2) 
Income Repatriation Tax Cost 10.7895 
 
 
(0.003) 
 Alternative Income Repatriation Tax Cost 
 
2.0665 
  
(0.030) 
Log of Total Assets -0.1480 -0.1451 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Income/Total Assets 0.0202 0.0252 
 
(0.620) (0.536) 
Foreign Income/Total Assets -0.0211 -0.0270 
 
(0.662) (0.579) 
Market-to-Book Value of Equity 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.892) (0.885) 
Leverage -0.9439 -0.9475 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets   -2.4525 -2.4260 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Expenses/Total Assets -2.2716 -2.2789 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Payout/Total Assets -3.6801 -3.6890 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
St. Dev. of Operating Income 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept -1.5607 -1.6184 
  (0.059) (0.051) 
Country Dummy Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes 
N 8,387 8,387 
Adj. R2 0.401 0.396 
  
20 
 
Table 4 
Dividend Payout Yield and Income Repatriation Tax Cost 
This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect Tobit regressions with the dividend payout yield as 
dependent variable.  The dividend payout yield is the firm’s annual dividend payments divided by its 
year-end market value. The main explanatory variables are the income repatriation tax cost in the first 
specification and the alternative income repatriation tax in the second specification.  All variables are 
described in the appendix.  The regressions include country and industry fixed effects. P-values, obtained 
with standard errors corrected for clustering of errors by firm, are presented in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout Yield 
  (1) (2) 
Income Repatriation Tax Cost -0.5220 
 
 
(0.002) 
 Alternative Income Repatriation Tax Cost 
 
-0.1608 
  
(0.002) 
Log of Total Assets 0.0057 0.0055 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Income/Total Assets 0.1001 0.0985 
 
(0.000) (0.536) 
Foreign Income/Total Assets 0.1150 0.1245 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book Value of Equity -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.179) (0.170) 
Leverage -0.0144 -0.0137 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets   0.0015 -0.0009 
 
(0.921) (0.952) 
R&D Expenses/Total Assets -0.1361 -0.1355 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
St. Dev. of Operating Income -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Intercept -0.2167 -0.2135 
  (0.997) (0.998) 
Country Dummy Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes 
N 8,415 8,415 
Pseudo R2 0.454 0.441 
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Table 5 
Net Payout Yield and Income Repatriation Tax Cost 
This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect Tobit regressions with the total payout yield as 
dependent variable.  The net payout yield is the firm’s annual dividend payments plus share repurchase 
amount minus equity issuance, all divided by its year-end market value. The main explanatory variables 
are the income repatriation tax cost in the first specification and the alternative income repatriation tax in 
the second specification.  All variables are described in the appendix.  The regressions include country 
and industry fixed effects. P-values, obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of errors by 
firm, are presented in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Net Payout Yield 
  (1) (2) 
Income Repatriation Tax Cost -0.5949 
 
 
(0.003) 
 Alternative Income Repatriation Tax Cost 
 
-0.2034 
  
(0.001) 
Log of Total Assets 0.0063 0.0061 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Income/Total Assets 0.1065 0.1052 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Income/Total Assets 0.1309 0.1430 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book Value of Equity -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.152) (0.145) 
Leverage -0.0129 -0.0122 
 
(0.002) (0.003) 
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets   -0.0286 -0.0316 
 
(0.106) (0.075) 
R&D Expenses/Total Assets -0.1373 -0.1374 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
St. Dev. of Operating Income -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.017) (0.015) 
Intercept -0.2550 -0.2394 
  (0.998) (0.998) 
Country Dummy Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes 
N 8,415 8,415 
Pseudo R2 0.438 0.420 
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Table 6 
Foreign Investments and Income Repatriation Tax Cost 
This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect regressions with foreign capital expenditures to total 
assets as dependent variable.  The main explanatory variables are the income repatriation tax cost in the 
first specification and the alternative income repatriation tax in the second specification.  Purely domestic 
firms are excluded from the sample. All variables are described in the appendix.  The regressions include 
country and industry fixed effects. P-values, obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of 
errors by firm, are presented in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Income Repatriation Tax Cost 0.6465 
 
 
(0.021) 
 Alternative Income Repatriation Tax Cost 
 
0.3568 
  
(0.084) 
Log of Total Assets 0.0019 0.0021 
 
(0.004) (0.001) 
Domestic Income/Total Assets -0.0050 -0.0021 
 
(0.563) (0.556) 
Foreign Income/Total Assets 0.0008 0.0010 
 
(0.729) (0.652) 
Market-to-Book Value of Equity -0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.952) (0.962) 
Leverage -0.0007 -0.0006 
 
(0.907) (0.926) 
Lag Capital Expenditures/Total Assets   0.1314 0.1324 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Expenses/Total Assets -0.0053 -0.0055 
 
(0.769) (0.761) 
St. Dev. of Operating Income -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.096) (0.046) 
Intercept 0.1361 0.0156 
  (0.743) (0.707) 
Country Dummy Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes 
N 1,147 1,147 
Adj. R2 0.246 0.211 
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Table 7 
Domestic Investments and Income Repatriation Tax Cost 
This table presents the coefficients of fixed effect regressions with domestic capital expenditures to total 
assets as dependent variable.  The main explanatory variables are the income repatriation tax cost in the 
first specification and the alternative income repatriation tax in the second specification.  Purely domestic 
firms are excluded from the sample. All variables are described in the appendix.  The regressions include 
country and industry fixed effects. P-values, obtained with standard errors corrected for clustering of 
errors by firm, are presented in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Income Repatriation Tax Cost -0.1119 
 
 
(0.774) 
 Alternative Income Repatriation Tax 
Cost 
 
-0.5570 
  
(0.263) 
Log of Total Assets -0.0017 -0.0017 
 
(0.089) (0.078) 
Domestic Income/Total Assets 0.0029 0.0035 
 
(0.639) (0.570) 
Foreign Income/Total Assets 0.0028 0.0023 
 
(0.403) (0.490) 
Market-to-Book Value of Equity 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.371) (0.392) 
Leverage 0.0272 0.0266 
 
(0.0031) (0.0036) 
Lag Capital Expenditures/Total Assets   0.1736 0.1731 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Expenses/Total Assets -0.0349 -0.0351 
 
(0.141) (0.137) 
St. Dev. of Operating Income -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.058) (0.030) 
Intercept 0.0394 0.0343 
  (0.512) (0.567) 
Country Dummy Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes 
N 1,147 1,147 
Adj. R2 0.218 0.196 
 
